Involuntary Sale Damages in Permanent Nuisance Cases: A Bigger Bang from Boomer by Hiley, Raymond D
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 4
9-1-1986
Involuntary Sale Damages in Permanent Nuisance
Cases: A Bigger Bang from Boomer
Raymond D. Hiley
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Raymond D. Hiley, Involuntary Sale Damages in Permanent Nuisance Cases: A Bigger Bang from
Boomer, 14 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 61 (1986), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol14/iss1/4
INVOLUNTARY SALE DAMAGES IN PERMANENT 
NUISANCE CASES: A BIGGER BANG FROM BOOMER 
Raymond D. Hiley* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During its evolution in the last one hundred years, the permanent 
nuisance doctrine has significantly changed prior concepts of damage 
recovery in nuisance actions. Before courts began to apply the per-
manent nuisance doctrine, a plaintiff in a nuisance or trespass suit 
was allowed to recover damages for future injuries only if the tort 
involved a permanent, physical change in his property.1 A plaintiff's 
future damages were measured by the diminution of the property's 
fair market value caused by the defendant's actions.2 If the tort 
involved a temporary injury to the property, though, the plaintiff 
was allowed to recover only for injuries which had occurred prior to 
the suit, even if the temporary injury was of a frequently recurring 
nature.3 Starting in the late nineteenth century, courts began to 
recognize that a temporary injury to the plaintiff's property could 
give rise to future damages if such an invasion was likely to recur. 4 
In these cases, the defendant's activity was deemed to be a perma-
nent nuisance. 
Today, the permanent nuisance doctrine has evolved into a widely 
accepted, but not uniform, doctrine. In determining whether a re-
curring invasion of the plaintiff's property rights constitutes a per-
manent nuisance, the key issue is the likelihood that such invasions 
will continue with the requisite frequency. In resolving this issue, 
* Editor in Chief, 1986-1987, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review. 
The author would like to thank Professor Zygmunt Plater for his invaluable guidance and 
advice. 
1 See infra notes 15-24 and accompanying text. 
2 See infra note 19. 
3 See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text. 
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courts consider such factors as the ability of the plaintiff to get 
injunctive relief,5 the physical permanence of the structure causing 
the invasion,6 and whether or not the nuisance value of the defen-
dant's activity is a result of negligence in carrying on that activity. 7 
Despite wide acceptance of the doctrine, it has also been criticized 
by both courts and commentators. Most significantly, critics assert 
that the permanent nuisance doctrine is inconsistent with the concept 
of ownership of private property. 8 This criticism is based on the 
argument that the permanent nuisance doctrine allows the defendant 
to acquire, against the plaintiff's will, the legal right to cause future 
injury to the plaintiff's property. This involuntary transfer of a 
package of rights that is essentially an easement seems inconsistent 
with the idea that a private property owner has the right to exclusive 
control of his property, except when an important public interest is 
involved. Conversely, the principle advantage of the permanent nuis-
ance doctrine seems to be that it gives the court an alternative to 
the harsh remedy of injunction. 
Another less noticed, but related drawback of the doctrine is the 
inadequacy of the diminution of market value as the sole measure of 
permanent damages. This measure probably results from the doc-
trine's roots in eminent domain law and traditional nuisance law. A 
large number of early permanent nuisance cases involved public or 
quasi-public bodies that possessed the power of eminent domain. 9 
These entities were able to take an easement on the plaintiff's 
property in return for the market value of the easement. The courts 
therefore limited the plaintiff's recovery to the same amount when 
the defendant acquired the easement in a permanent nuisance suit. 10 
Further, the early courts analogized recurring property invasions to 
physically permanent damages, for which recovery of diminution of 
market value was traditionally allowed. 11 The courts consequently 
adopted the permanent damage measure as the permanent nuisance 
measure. 
These two bases for the application of the diminution of market 
value measure, though, are no longer valid in many permanent 
nuisance cases. Today, the permanent nuisance doctrine is often 
applied to cases where the defendant is a private citizen. 12 In these 
5 See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text. 
S See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
S See infra notes 82-95 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 105-110 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 121-123 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 72, 110 and accompanying text. 
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cases, the original rationale based on eminent domain is not appli-
cable. When courts use the diminution of market value in such cases, 
they fail to recognize that a permanent nuisance is not a taking of 
property for a public purpose, but instead is a tortious invasion of 
the plaintiff's property rights by another private citizen. Further-
more, a permanent nuisance differs from a permanent injury. A 
permanent nuisance involves not only a permanent diminution of the 
plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his property, but also a derogation 
of the plaintiff's right to free disposition of his property. When courts 
apply the permanent nuisance doctrine, they force an involuntary 
sale of an easement at a price they determine. This derogation of 
dispositional rights does not occur in permanent injury cases. The 
diminution of market value compensates only for the easement lost, 
and is therefore inadequate to compensate the plaintiff fully for his 
losses. 
Future damages, as measured by diminution of market value, are 
inconsistent with recognized elements of past damages. The ele-
ments of past damages include not only diminution of use and enjoy-
ment, which is considered to be an injury to the property, but also 
discomfort, annoyance, and inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff. 
In a permanent nuisance case, the diminution of market value only 
compensates the plaintiff for future diminution of his use and enjoy-
ment. The plaintiff is not compensated for his future discomfort, 
annoyance, and inconvenience, which the plaintiff will suffer as a 
result of the continuing nuisance. Because a plaintiff is allowed to 
recover for past annoyance and discomfort, but not for future an-
noyance and discomfort, the measure of future damages in perma-
nent nuisance cases is inconsistent with the measure of past dam-
ages. 
Finally, the use of diminution of market value as the sole measure 
of damages can be economically inefficient. The diminution of market 
value takes into account only the community consensus of the amount 
of injury to the property.13 It is likely that the individual owner of 
the property attaches certain subjective values to the property over 
and above those attached by the community at large. The defendant 
is forced to pay only for the community's value of the injury and not 
for the owner's subjective value. Thus, the defendant is not required 
to internalize the full cost of his activity. Failure to internalize the 
full cost, in turn, leads to an economically inefficient decision by the 
defendant about the level of his activity. 
This Comment examines the permanent nuisance doctrine, focus-
ing primarily on the issue of the measure of damages. Initially, the 
18 See infra note 134. 
64 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:61 
Comment considers the evolution of the permanent nuisance doctrine 
from the traditional concepts of nuisance and trespass law. The 
second section discusses in greater detail the various measures of 
damages in permanent nuisance cases. This section concludes that 
courts should permit recovery of additional damages for injuries 
resulting from the involuntary sale that is inherent in the doctrine. 
The third and final section presents one court's practical approach 
which compensates the plaintiff fully while seeming to avoid some 
of the valuation pitfalls of these additional damages. 
II. THE PERMANENT NUISANCE DOCTRINE 
A. Evolution 
In the nineteenth century, the remedies available in nuisance and 
trespass cases depended on the nature of the injury to the property. 
If the defendant's activity was likely to result in substantial harm, 
and money damages would not provide an adequate remedy, the 
plaintiff was entitled to seek an injunction in equity.14 In addition, 
the plaintiff could bring an action at law for damages. 15 The plaintiff 
could in all cases recover for past personal injuries resulting from 
the invasion. The recoverable elements of such personal injuries 
included injury to the health of the plaintiff and his family,16 and in 
some cases, past annoyance, discomfort, and mental distress. 17 
In addition to damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff could 
also recover for injuries to his property. The measure of damages, 
,. E.g., Oswald v. Wolf, 129 Ill. 200, 209, 21 N.E. 839, 840 (1889) (denying equitable relief 
to a plaintiff in a nuisance suit on the grounds that the plaintiff's legal rights had not been 
established); Sam Warren and Son Stone Co. v. Gruesser, 307 Ky. 98, 104,209 S.W.2d 817, 
820 (Ct. App. 1948) (affirming a lower court's injunction of stone cutting engines that created 
noise and vibrations on the grounds that the defendant did not show disproportionate hardship 
would result from the injunction and that damages were inadequate to compensate the plain-
tiff); Powell v. Bentley and Gerwig Furniture Co., 34 W.Va. 804, 811, 12 S.E. 1085, 1087 
(1891) (refusing to enjoin a factory as a nuisance on the grounds that plaintiff had not 
established that the factory was a legal nuisance); Wood v. Sutcliff, 61 Eng. Rep. 303, 303-
04 (1851). 
16 E.g., City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 51 Ariz. 115, 124, 75 P.2d 30,34 (1938); Powell, 34 W. 
Va. at 811, 12 S.E. at 1087. See generally 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 139 (1950). 
16 E.g., Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal.2d 265,273,288 P.2d 507,512 (1955); 
Sam Finley, Inc. v. Russell, 75 Ga.App. 112, 117, 42 S.E.2d 452, 456 (Ga. Ct. App. 1947) 
(upholding the plaintiff's cause of action in nuisance for damages for personal injuries due to 
smoke and dust emitted from defendant's asphalt processing plant); Gergeson v. Fermenich 
Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576,582,42 N.W. 448, 450 (1899). 
17 E.g., Baltimore and Potomac R.R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 329 (1883); 
Krulikowski v. Polycast Corp., 153 Conn. 661, 670, 220 A.2d 444,449 (1966); Kornoff45 Cal.2d 
at 273,288 P.2d at 512; Sam Finley 75 Ga. App. at 117, 42 S.E.2d at 456. See generally 66 
C.J.S. Nuisances § 174 (1950). 
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however, differed according to the nature of the injury. If the nuis-
ance or trespass resulted in a permanent physical injury to the 
property, the plaintiff was required to sue for all damages, past, 
present, and future, in one action. is In such cases, the damages were 
measured by the diminution of the property's fair market value,19 or 
by the cost of repairing the injury.2o In Jacksonville, Tampa, and 
Key West Ry. Co. v. Lockwood,21 for instance, the defendant railway 
company dug up the plaintiff's property and laid track across the 
property. The trial court admitted testimony regarding the diminu-
tion of the property's market value. 22 On appeal, the defendant 
argued that the plaintiff could only recover for damage incurred 
prior to the suit rather than recover the entire damages sustained. 23 
The Florida Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to 
recover the diminution of market value since the injury done to the 
plaintiff's property was permanent in nature. 24 
In contrast, if the invasion involved a temporary, recurring inva-
sion with no physical injury to the land, the plaintiff could recover 
only for past injuries. 25 Any injuries to the person and property 
resulting from subsequent invasions gave rise to a new cause of 
action for damages. In Cooper v. Randall,26 for example, the defen-
dant's flour mill emitted chaff, dust, and dirt which settled on the 
plaintiff's property. The plaintiff appealed the trial court's refusal 
to admit evidence concerning the diminution of the property's market 
value. 27 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the lower court's refusal, 
noting that this case did not involve permanent damages, and there-
fore plaintiff was entitled to recover only past damages. 28 
One of the primary reasons courts distinguished between perma-
nent and temporary injuries was the presumption that the defendant 
18E.g., Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 245, 37 S.W.2d 518,521 (1931); City 
of Amarillo v. Ware, 120 Tex. 456, 461, 40 S.W.2d 57, 61 (1931). See generally 1 Sedgwick, 
Darrw,ges §§ 94-95 (9th Ed. 1920); McCormick, Damages § 127 (1935). 
19 Jacksonville, Tampa, & Key West Ry. Co. v. Lockwood, 33 Fla. 573, 586, 15 So. 327,331 
(1894); N. Indiana Pub. Servo CO. V. Vesey, 210 Ind. 338, 353, 200 N.E. 620, 627 (1936). See 
generally 66 C.J. S. Nuisances § 175 (1950) and cases cited therein. 
20 E.g., Stratford Theater, Inc. V. Stratford, 140 Conn. 422, 424, 101 A.2d 279, 280 (1953); 
Braun V. Iannotti, 57 R.1. 194, 195, 189 A. 25, 26 (1937). 
21 33 Fla. 573, 15 So. at 327 (1894). 
22 Id. at 578, 15 So. at 329. 
23 Id. at 579-80, 15 So. at 329. 
24 Id. at 596, 15 So. at 334-35. 
25 See, e.g., Cooper V. Randall, 59 Ill. 317 (1871); Langford V. Owsley, 5 Ky. 215 (1810); 
Shelley V. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S. W.2d 518 (1931). See generally Sedgwick, 
supra note 18, § 91 and cases cited therein. 
26 59 Ill. 317 (1871). 
27Id. at 321. 
28 Id. at 321-22. 
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would not continue an unlawful activity.29 Courts assumed that once 
the defendant's activity was found to be unlawful, the defendant 
would either voluntarily cease the unlawful activity due to threat of 
further liability, or that the plaintiff could obtain an injunction if the 
defendant continued the activity.30 As such, the courts thought that 
the defendant should not be required to pay for damages which might 
not occur. 31 
Contrary to these assumptions, however, the plaintiff was not 
always able to secure abatement of the nuisance. The plaintiff was 
allowed to recover damages as a matter of right once the nuisance 
and injury was established.32 But whether an injunction should issue 
was up to the discretion of the court.33 To obtain an injunction, the 
plaintiff was required to show that, absent an injunction, he would 
suffer irreparable injury, and that he was without adequate remedy 
at law.34 In addition, the courts employed a balancing test: no in-
junction would issue if the issuance of the injunction would cause 
the defendant harm greater than the harm suffered by the plaintiff 
as a result of continuation of the nuisance. 35 In Wood v. Sutcliff, 36 
for instance, the plaintiff was a wool yarn producer who relied on 
water from an adjacent river to cleanse its wool. The defendant 
operated a dye plant upstream from the plaintiff. Periodically the 
defendant's wool dying operations polluted the water. After obtain-
ing nominal damages in a nuisance action at law, the plaintiff sued 
in equity for an injunction. The equity court denied the injunction; 
it balanced the equities and determined that the defendant's business 
would be ruined if an injunction was issued. 37 The plaintiff was left 
29 Cumberland and Oxford Canal Corp. v. Hitchings, 65 Me. 140, 140-41 (1876); Uline v. 
New York Cen. and Hudson River R.R. Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 112,4 N.E. 536, 543 (1886); Bartlett 
v. Grasselli Chern. Co., 92 W. Va. 445, 454, 115 S.E. 451, 454 (1922) (overturning an award 
of permanent damages on the grounds that defendant's c)J.emical manufacturing plant was an 
abatable nuisance, and thus did not constitute a permanent nuisance). 
30 Bartlett, 92 W. Va. at 451, 115 S.E. at 453. 
81 Shelley, 327 Mo. at 246,37 S.W.2d at 521. 
32 Powell, 34 W. Va. at 811, 12 S.E. at 1087. 
33 Haack v. Lindsay Light and Chern. Co., 393 Ill. 367, 370, 66 N.E.2d 391, 393 (1946), 
rev'g 325 Ill. App. 581, 60 N.E.2d 578 (Ill. Ct. App. 1945) (overturning an injunction of a 
chemical factory that emitted chemicals and smoke on the grounds that the plaintiffs suffered 
only nominal damages and that the defendant was engaged in a lawful and important business); 
Powell, 34 W. Va. at 811, 12 S.E. at 1087. 
34 Oswald, 129 Ill. at 209, 21 N.E. at 839-40; Wood, 61 Eng. Rep. at 303-04. 
35 See, e.g., Haack v. Lindsay Light and Chern. Co., 393 Ill. 367, 66 N.E.2d 391 (1946); 
Powell v. Bentley and Gerwig Furniture Co., 34 W. Va. 804, 12 S.E. 1085 (1891); Wood v. 
Sutcliff, 61 Eng. Rep. 303 (1851). 
36 61 Eng. Rep. 303 (1851). 
37 [d. at 304-05. 
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with his legal remedy, which was the nominal damages awarded by 
the court of law. Furthermore, because the defendant was unlikely 
to shut down its plant to abate the nuisance voluntarily, the plaintiff 
was forced to sue for past damages each time the defendant polluted 
the river. As a result, the plaintiff's only recourse was to bring 
successive suits for damages. 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the courts began to 
recognize that a temporary, recurring invasion of the plaintiff's prop-
erty rights could give rise to damages for future injuries. The case 
that opened the door to recovery of permanent damages in these 
instances is Town of Troy v. Cheshire Ry. CO.38 There, the town of 
Troy sued the Cheshire Railway Company for laying tracks across 
a road and tearing down a bridge in order to construct a railroad 
bridge. 39 At the trial, the railroad argued that the town could recover 
damages only for past injuries, and, since the town had not yet paid 
out any money to replace the road and bridge, no recovery could be 
had.40 The New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the defendant's 
argument and awarded damages to the plaintiff based on diminution 
of the market value of the road and the bridge. The court noted, 
Wherever the nuisance is of such a character, that its continuance 
is necessarily an injury, and where it is of a permanent character, 
that will continue without change from any cause but human 
labor, there, the damage is an original damage, and may be at 
once fully compensated, since the injured person has no means 
to compel the individual doing the wrong, to apply the labor 
necessary to remove the cause of the injury . . . . 
But where the continuance of such act is not necessarily in-
jurious, and where it is necessarily of a permanent character, 
but may, or may not be, continued there the injury ... is only 
the damage that has happened. 41 
Ironically, the use of diminution of market value as the measure of 
damages in this case was consistent with the traditional view of 
damages in trespass and nuisance cases because the injury was a 
permanent one for which permanent damages were recoverable. 42 
However, the language of the case was used in subsequent cases as 
precedent for the idea that future damages are recoverable in nuis-
ance cases that do not involve a permanent injury to the land. 43 
38 23 N.H. 83 (1851). 
39 Id. at 83-84. 
4°Id. at 101. 
41Id. at 102. 
42 McConnick, supra note 18, at § 127. 
43 See, e.g., Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. McCray, 106 Va. 461, 56 S.E. 216 (1907) (citing 
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Early in the twentieth century, courts began to focus on the 
permanence of the source of the invasion rather than the permanence 
of the effect of the invasion. 44 If the structure that injuriously af-
fecting the plaintiff's property was permanent, and the continuance 
of the injurious effect was relatively certain, then the injury to the 
property was considered permanent, or "original. "45 The result was 
that the plaintiff was allowed to recover damages for injuries that 
were likely, but not certain, to occur. In City of Paris v. Allred, 46 
for example, the defendant-municipality built a sewer that emptied 
into a stream running across the plaintiff's property. The waste 
discharged by the sewer was deposited onto the plaintiff's property, 
rendering it unfit for use. In determining that the sewer was a 
permanent injury that justified the plaintiff's recovery of permanent 
damages, the Texas Civic Court of Appeals noted, 
[t]he main question in the case is ... whether or not the cause 
of the nuisance is permanent in its character, and entitles the 
plaintiff to recover all the damages in one suit, or whether the 
nuisance is temporary in its nature, and entitles plaintiff to 
recover only such special damages as may have accrued up to 
the time of the suit .... We think it clear from the evidence 
. . . that the damages to [plaintiff's] land result from a cause 
permanent in its character. 47 
There was no showing that the plaintiff's land was permanently 
affected by past sewage deposits. It would seem likely that, if the 
sewage flow was abated, the sewage already deposited on the plain-
tiff's land would decay and leave the plaintiff's property as it was 
before the sewage was deposited. Under the traditional view, then, 
the plaintiff was entitled to recover only for past damages to the 
property, that is, diminution of the property's rental value. Since 
the sewer was a relatively permanent structure, however, and since 
the sewage deposition was likely to continue as long as the sewer 
remained, the plaintiff was allowed to recover future damages as 
Troy as support for the holding that a sewer depositing waste on the plaintiff's land constituted 
a permanent nuisance). 
44 See, e.g., Highland Ave. and Belt R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 99 Ala. 24, 10 So. 267 (1891); 
City of North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314, 2 N.E. 821 (1855); Stodghill v. Chicago, B. & 
Q. R.R. Co., 53 Iowa 341, 5 N.W. 495 (1880); Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. McCray, 106 Va. 
461,56 S.E. 216 (1907). But see Uline, 101 N.Y. 98, 4 N.E. 536; Carl v. Sheboygan and Fond 
Du Lac R.R. Co., 46 Wis. 625, 1 N.W. 295 (1879). See generally McCormick, supra note 18, 
at § 43. 
45 Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. McCray, 106 Va. 461, 464, 56 S.E. 216, 218 (1907). 
46 43 S. W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897). 
47 [d. at 63. 
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well as past damages despite the absence of physically permanent 
damage. 
B. The Modern Permanent Nuisance Doctrine 
Today, the concept of permanent nuisances is widely accepted. 
The courts, however, have expressed a variety of opinions on what 
constitutes a permanent as opposed to a temporary nuisance. 48 In 
general, the essential element of a permanent nuisance is that the 
nuisance will not be abated.49 Accordingly, a central question in 
permanent nuisance cases is whether injunctive relief is available to 
the plaintiff. 50 As a general rule, the defendant's activities will be 
enjoined unless he has a legal right to maintain the activity,51 or 
unless the activity is lawful. 52 For instance, in Lyons v. Fairmont 
Real Estate CO.,53 the defendant constructed a road embankment 
partly on the plaintiff's land. The West Virginia Supreme Court 
ruled that the lower court had erred in admitting evidence of the 
diminution in the market value of the plaintiff's property, on the 
grounds that permanent damages were not recoverable. 54 The court 
noted that permanent damages may be recovered in certain cases 
where the structure causing the nuisance is built solely on the de-
fendant's property. 55 But if the structure causing the nuisance is 
wholly or partially on the plaintiff's property, only temporary dam-
ages may be recovered, since the defendant has no right to maintain 
the structure on the plaintiff's property. 56 In such a case, the nuis-
ance would not be considered permanent since the cause of the 
nuisance would be unlawful, and thus subject to abatement. In con-
trast, activities which benefit the public, that is, activities carried 
48 Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S. W.2d 498, 503 (Mo. ct. App. 1972) (discussing at 
length the difference between a temporary and a permanent nuisance); McCormick, supra 
note 18, at § 127. 
49 Vesey, 210 Ind. at 353,200 N.E. at 627; Kentucky-Ohio Gas v. Bowling, 264 Ky. 470, 477, 
95 S.W.2d I, 5 (1936); Shelley, 327 Mo. at 242, 37 S.W.2d at 519; Spain, 484 S.W. at 504; 
Bartlett, 92 W. Va. at 451, 115 S.E. at 453. 
50 Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal.2d 265, 267, 239 P.2d 625, 627 (1952) (overturning an award 
of diminution of market value and remanding to determine whether the defendant's improperly 
filled slope constituted a permanent nuisance, or whether it constituted a temporary, abatable 
nuisance); Bartlett, 92 W. Va. at 451, 115 S.E. at 453. 
51 Vesey, 210 Ind. at 351, 200 N.E. at 627; Bartlett, 92 W. Va. at 451, 115 S.E. at 453. 
62 Shelley, 327 Mo. at 242,37 S.W.2d at 519. 
53 71 W. Va. 754 (1912). 
54 [d. at 759-62. 
55 [d. at 759. 
56 [d. at 760. 
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on by entities vested with eminent domain power, are generally 
considered lawful and therefore not subject to abatement. 57 
In addition to being lawful, courts have also required that the 
nuisance arise from the inherent nature of the activity and not from 
negligence in undertaking the activity. 58 In Shelley v. Ozark Pipeline 
Corp. ,59 the Supreme Court of Missouri held that a leaking oil pipe-
line was a temporary nuisance. The court noted, 
In order for a nuisance to be permanent, it is usually necessary 
that the nuisance be created by the inherent character of a 
structure or business and that its lawful and necessary operation 
creates a permanent injury. Where, however, the structure or 
character of the business, when properly conducted and oper-
ated, does not constitute a nuisance, but only becomes such 
through negligence, then the nuisance or injury is temporary 
and abatable. 60 
Since a leak in the oil pipeline was not essential to the pipeline's use, 
but was a result of the oil company's negligence, the nuisance in this 
case was deemed temporary and abatable. 61 
In determining whether permanent damages will be awarded in 
lieu of an injunction, courts have compared the burden that would 
be imposed on the defendant if an injunction was issued to the burden 
that would be imposed on the plaintiff if the defendant were allowed 
to continue the nuisance. This principle has been referred to as the 
comparative hardship doctrine, or the balancing of hardship doc-
trine. 62 If the injury suffered by the plaintiff is minor compared to 
the cost to the defendant of abatement, then the nuisance will not 
be enjoined and will be considered permanent. 63 In Harrisonville v. 
Dickey Clay CO.,64 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the discharge of 
57 Spau.lding, 38 Cal.2d at 267, 239 P.2d at 627; Vesey, 210 Ind. at 353, 200 N.E. at 626; 
Bartlett, 92 W. Va. at 452, 555, 115 S.E. at 453--54. See KornoJf, 45 Cal.2d at 270, 288 P.2d 
at 510. See generally Note, Enjoining Private Nu.isances: Consideration of the Public Interest, 
43 U. Colo. L. Rev. 225 (1971). 
68 Kentucky-Ohio Gas, 264 Ky. at 477, 95 S.W.2d at 5; Shelley, 327 Mo. at 242,37 S.W.2d 
at 519 and cases cited therein. 
59 327 Mo. 238, 37 S. W.2d 518 (1931). 
00 Id. at 242,37 S.W.2d at 519. 
61 Id. at 243,37 S.W.2d at 520. 
62 See genemlly Maram, Nuisance Abatement: Use of the Comparative Injury Doctrine, 
Urban L. Ann. 1971:206; Note, Private Nuisance - Abatement and Injunction - Disparity of 
Economic Consequences, 22 Cas. W. Res. L. Rev. 356 (1971); Note, Remedies - Private 
Nuisance - Compamtive Injury Doctrine in West Virginia, 77 W. Va. L. Rev. 780 (1975). 
63 Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1932); see Boomer, 25 N.Y.2d 
at 223-27,309 N.Y.S.2d at 315-17,257 N.E.2d at 872-73. 
64 289 U.S. 334 (1932). 
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inadequately treated sewage by the plaintiff municipality into a 
stream that ran across the plaintiff's pasture. The federal district 
court awarded the injunction and damages to compensate for the 
cost of restoring the land to its original condition. 65 The Eighth 
Circuit Court denied the damages, but affirmed the injunction. The 
U.S. Supreme Court noted that, if the injunction were granted, the 
city's available options would be to abandon a $60,000 disposal plant 
and leave the residents with no sewage disposal facilities at all, or 
to build an auxiliary sewage treatment plant for $25,000. 66 On the 
other hand, denial of the injunction would subject the plaintiff to a 
loss of property value amounting to approximately $100 per year. 67 
Based on these facts, the Court denied the injunction and awarded 
the plaintiff depreciation of the property's market value, because 
"the compensation payable would obviously be small as compared 
with the cost of installing an auxiliary plant .... "68 Thus, a court 
may declare the defendant's activity a permanent nuisance when an 
injunction is unavailable to the plaintiff due to the comparatively 
greater burden on the defendant resulting from abatement. 
This doctrine is based on the traditional equitable principle that 
an injunction, as a drastic remedy, is to be used at the discretion of 
the court, and only when dictated by the equities of the case.69 Where 
money damages will adequately compensate the plaintiff for his in-
jury, and an injunction would subject the defendant to "grossly 
disproportionate hardship," then an injunction should not issue. 7o In 
most instances, this balancing test has been applied in cases where 
the defendant is acting for the public good. 71 The balancing test has 
also been applied in instances where the defendant is a private 
entity.72 When the court declares the defendant's activity a perma-
nent nuisance, the plaintiff's remedy is not limited to the initiation 
65 [d. at 337. 
66 [d. at 339. 
67 [d. 
68 [d. 
69 Harrisonville, 289 U.S. at 337-38; Haack, 393 Ill. at 370, 66 N.E.2d at 392. See Wood v. 
Sutcliff, 61 Eng. Rep. 303 (1851). 
70 Harrisonville, 289 U.S. at 338. But see Pendoly v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 
142 (1963) (injunction awarded despite disparity in economic consequences). 
71 See, e.g., Huebachmann v. Grand Co., 166 Md. 615,172 A. 227 (1934); Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d 
at 230-31,309 N.Y.S.2d at 321,257 N.E.2d at 876 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
72 Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334. See, e.g., Patz v. Farmegg Products, 
Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 1972) (upholding a finding that the defendant's chicken farm 
constituted a permanent nuisance based on the balance of hardship test); Boomer, 26 N. Y.2d 
219,309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 N.E.2d 870. 
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of multiple suits for past damages even though the nuisance is phys-
ically abatable. 73 
Finally, courts have stated that the physical permanence of the 
structure causing the nuisance is a factor in distinguishing a per-
manent nuisance from a temporary nuisance. If the invasion is caused 
by a structure or condition that is relatively permanent, or treated 
as such by the parties, the court will declare it a permanent nuis-
ance. 74 In Wright v. City of Richmond, 75 for example, the city built 
a road embankment across a stream running through the plaintiff's 
property. The culvert under the embankment was insufficient to 
handle the flow of water in the stream during heavy rainstorms. 76 
As a result, the water in the stream often backed up and flooded the 
plaintiff's property. In determining whether the culvert constituted 
a permanent nuisance, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that the 
culvert was "built for present and future use," and that it was 
"constructed with a view towards permanency."77 As such, the court 
held that the culvert was a permanent nuisance. 78 
One should note, however, that this permanency test makes sense 
only if one assumes that the defendant will not, or cannot, alter the 
offending structure to avoid future injury. Future damages are given 
on the theory that the injury to the property, though temporary, is 
likely to recur in the future. 79 When the injury is caused by a struc-
ture alone, such as a culvert, future injury is likely only if the 
defendant does not remove or repair the offending structure. In 
Wright, for example, the city might have altered the culvert so that 
the water would not back up. By awarding permanent damages, the 
court assumed that such alterations would not be made. Such an 
assumption may be logically based on the balancing of hardships test 
noted earlier,80 or on the fact that the parties themselves assume 
that the structure will not be altered, as in Wright.81 
73 Harrisonville, 289 U.S. at 339-40. See Vesey, 210 Ind. at 353--54, 200 N.E. at 627. 
74 Stodghill v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co., 53 Iowa 341,5 N.W. 495 (1880); Amarillo, 120 
Tex. at 467,40 S.W.2d at 61; see Southern Ry. Co. v. White, 128 Va. 551, 566, 104 S.E. 865, 
870 (1920). See generally 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 5 (1950). 
75 146 Va. 835 (1926). 
76 [d. at 838. 
77 [d. at 842. 
78 [d. at 843. 
79 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
80 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
81 In Wright, the court agreed with the city that the court was not empowered to alter or 
revise the city's drainage plans. Wright, 146 Va. at 835. Thus, the culvert could not be altered 
by order of the court; nor did the city argue that they could or would alter the culvert. It 
follows that the court had to determine the likelihood of future flooding based on the present 
condition of the culvert. This raises the question of whetbEit a structure would be deemed a 
", 
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C. Critique o/the Permanent Nuisance Doctrine 
Despite wide judicial acceptance of the permanent nuisance doc-
trine, it is not without its critics. The most significant criticism is 
that, because the permanent nuisance doctrine essentially forces the 
plaintiff to sell an easement on his land to the defendant, it is an 
unconstitutional taking of private property when the defendant is a 
private citizen. Presumably, this criticism is based on the notion that 
the doctrine interferes with certain legal rights that define ownership 
of property. In the broadest sense, property consists not only of the 
physical object itself, but also of the right to free use, enjoyment, 
and disposal of one's acquisitions without control or diminution save 
by operation of the law.82 As a corollary, these property rights 
involve the negation of a neighbor's right to interfere unreasonably 
with, or lessen, the use and enjoyment of the property.83 In a per-
manent nuisance case, though, the neighbor-defendant acquires the 
right to continue the nuisance,84 thereby depriving the plaintiff of 
his right to undiminished use and enjoyment of his property. This 
permanent diminution of the owner's property rights is an easement 
on the property.86 While the plaintiff-owner could voluntarily sell 
such an easement to the defendant-neighbor, the application of the 
permanent nuisance doctrine forces the plaintiff to sell the easement 
to the defendant. When the defendant is a private party, the invol-
untary sale of the easement is a taking of property for private 
purposes, and therefore arguably unconstitutional. 86 
In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. ,87 for example, the defendant's 
cement factory emitted dirt, smoke, and vibration which injured the 
permanent nuisance if the defendant shows that the structure could be altered so as to prevent 
future flooding. 
82 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917); Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432, 
433-34, 249 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1978). 
88 Peabody v. U.S., 43 Ct. Cl. 5 (1907). 
84. Rebel v. BigTarldo Drainage District, 602 S.W.2d 787,792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing 
whether the defendant's levy, which caused plaintiff's land to flood, constituted a permanent 
nuisance for which no action could be maintained due to the statute of limitations, or whether 
the levy was a temporary nuisance for which recurring actions arose). 
86 [d. at 794; Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100, 106 (1962) (noise 
from operation of an airport held to constitute a taking of an easement requiring compensation 
to nearby property owners); Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 5.4 (1973). 
86 Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 245, 118 P. 928, 930 (1911) 
(enjoining operation of a cement plant that emitted large quantities of dust even though the 
defendant would suffer great hardship as a result of the injunction); Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 
231,309 N.Y.S.2d at 321,257 N.E.2d at 876 (Jansen, J., dissenting). See generally Maram, 
supra note 62, at 360; Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoni1¥!: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and 
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 740 (1973). 
In 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.8.2d 312,257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. App. 1970). 
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plaintiff's property. The New York Court of Appeals refused to 
enjoin the cement factory, and instead awarded permanent damages 
for a "servitude on the land of plaintiffs imposed by defendant's 
nuisance."88 Accordingly, the defendants acquired the right to injure 
the plaintiffs' property forever in return for damages. In his dissent, 
however, Judge Jasen argued that it was not "constitutionally per-
missible to impose servitude on the land, without the consent of the 
owner, by payment of permanent damages where the continuing 
impairment of the land is for a private use."89 
The concept of a forced sale is also inconsistent in other ways with 
the concept of property ownership. As mentioned earlier, the own-
er's right to dispose of his property freely is an inherent property 
right.90 As shown below, the dispositional aspect of ownership con-
sists of two closely intertwined rights: the right to decide whether 
to sell or not sell (the "selling right"), and the right to determine at 
what price the object will be sold (the "pricing right"). The selling 
right is embodied in the principle that the taking of property without 
the consent of the owner must be accompanied by a public purpose. 91 
Without a public purpose, then, the state may take private property 
only with the owner's consent. Similarly, transfer of property to 
another without the owner's consent is deemed to be an unlawful 
conversion.92 These protections afforded to private ownership of 
property represent the inherent right of property owners to decide 
whether or not to sell their property. The selling right, then, is a 
right inherent in property, and is qualified only by the ability of the 
government to take property for a public purpose. The pricing right 
is also an inherent attribute of the property itself. As such, it too is 
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.93 The owner's 
right to fix the price for his property may not be taken except by 
the government for an important public purpose. 94 
The forced sale resulting from application of the permanent nuis-
ance doctrine, however, derogates both the plaintiff's pricing and 
88 [d. at 228,309 N.Y.S.2d at 319,257 N.E.2d at 875. 
89 [d. at 231,309 N.Y.S.2d at 321,257 N.E.2d at 876. 
90 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
91 Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 315 (1859); Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 231,309 N.Y.S.2d at 
321,257 N.E.2d at 876 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
92 Conversion is generally defined as any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's 
personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein. Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 
Cal.2d 541, 549, 176 P.2d 1, 6 (1946). See generally 89 C.J.S. TTO'IJeT and Conversion § 3 
(1950). 
88 Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 192 (1936). 
94 Tyeson and Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430 (1927); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 
U.S. 235, 239 (1928). 
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selling rights. The plaintiff has no choice in deciding whether or not 
to sell the easement-he must sell it. Nor does the plaintiff have the 
right to determine at what price the easement will be sold-the price 
will be the diminution of market value. In Boomer, for example, the 
plaintiffs were forced to sell an easement to the cement company in 
return for the damages.95 Thus, the plaintiffs were not able to ex-
ercise either their right to decide whether to sell the easement, or 
their right to determine the price at which the easement was sold. 
Since the plaintiff loses these dispositional rights, the permanent 
nuisance doctrine is inconsistent with the concept of private prop-
erty. 
The chief advantage of a court awarding future damages is that 
the defendant, and society at large, does not incur considerably 
higher costs in abating the nuisance than the plaintiff would incur 
should the nuisance be allowed to continue. In Northern Indiana 
Public Service Co. v. VeseY,96 for instance, the plaintiff sought to 
enjoin the operation of an adjacent natural gas manufacturing factory 
that emitted ammonia, acid, and soot which killed the plants in the 
plaintiff's greenhouse. The gas from the factory provided the city of 
Fort Wayne, Indiana and neighboring towns with both heat and 
light; the gas plant itself cost $3,000,000.97 In comparison, the di-
minution of the market value of the plaintiff's property as a result 
of the gas plant's operation was only $150,000.98 The Indiana Su-
preme Court agreed with the lower court that the gas plant could 
not be enjoined since "less injury will be occasioned by requiring the 
defendant to pay the plaintiff all of the suffered damages . . . than 
by enjoining the operation of the defendant's said gas plant .... "99 
This rationale is the balancing of hardship test mentioned earlier. 100 
The assumption inherent in that test is that, if the plaintiff were 
awarded an injunction rather than future damages, the defendant 
would be forced to forgo his activity, even if the activity is worth 
more to society than the freedom from the nuisance is worth to the 
plaintiff. 101 One counterargument to this reasoning is that if the right 
to continue the activity is worth that much to the defendant, he will 
buy the plaintiff's right to enjoin the nuisance. 102 Despite this coun-
96 See infra notes 169-80 and accompanying text. 
96 210 Ind. 338, 200 N.E. 620 (1936). 
9'/Id. at 346-47, 200 N.E. at 624. 
98 Id. at 343, 200 N.E. at 622. 
99 Id. at 348, 200 N.E. at 624. 
100 See supra text and notes accompanying notes 62-73. 
101 ElJickson, supra note 86, at 736. 
102 Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Dam-
age Remedies, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1075, 1089-90 (1980). 
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terargument, most courts implicitly seem to adopt the former view 
when awarding future damages. 103 
III. DAMAGES IN PERMANENT NUISANCE CASES 
A. The Inadequacy of Diminution of Market Value as the Sole 
Measure of Damages 
Courts usually measure the future damages in permanent nuisance 
cases by the diminution in the market value of the plaintiff's prop-
erty.104 The diminution of market value, however, should not be the 
sole measure of damages in such cases where the defendant does not 
have eminent domain powers. The diminution of market value com-
pensates the plaintiff for the easement acquired by the defendant, 
but it fails to fully compensate the plaintiff for his injuries. A per-
manent nuisance is a tort rather than an eminent domain taking, 
therefore the court should focus on the injury to the plaintiff rather 
than the property taken. 
In the late nineteenth century, courts apparently adopted dimin-
ution of market value as the measure of damages in permanent 
nuisance cases because the permanent nuisance doctrine probably 
evolved from eminent domain actions. In early permanent nuisance 
cases, the defendant was frequently a public or quasi-public body 
endowed with eminent domain powers.105 In Highland Ave. and B. 
Ry. Co. v. Matthews,U)6 for example, a railroad company with emi-
nent domain powers built a railway embankment in the street ad-
jacent to the plaintiff's land, thus obstructing access to the prop-
erty.107 In an action for damages, the railroad company argued that, 
in a nuisance suit, the plaintiff could only recover past damages. 108 
The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that 
the defendants were authorized to build the embankment pursuant 
to the power of eminent domain. Accordingly, 
[i]f the injury was such that final compensation could have been 
had in condemnation proceedings, its character was not changed 
by the fact that such proceedings were not resorted to . . . . 
103 Ellickson, supra note 86, at 736. 
104 Vesey, 210 Ind. at 353,200 N.E. at 627; Amarillo, 120 Tex. at 467,40 S.W.2d at 61. 
105 McCormick, supra note 18, at § 127. 
106 99 Ala. 24, 10 So. 267 (1891). 
107 [d. at 26, 10 So. at 268. 
108 [d. at 28, 10 So. at 268. 
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Damages which can be assessed in condemnation proceedings 
can be assessed just as well in an ordinary action at law. 109 
77 
Many early permanent nuisance actions were in fact inverse condem-
nation actions in nuisance clothing. Recognizing this, courts mea-
sured the damages according to the appropriate eminent domain 
standards, rather than the more appropriate tort law standards. As 
courts extended the permanent nuisance doctrine to cases in which 
the defendant was a private entity, the courts also extended the 
market value measure of damages. 110 
Such an extension, however, is not justified. While the diminution 
of market value may be an appropriate measure of compensation for 
an eminent domain taking, it is not an appropriate measure of dam-
ages for all permanent nuisances. When the government takes or 
damages property for a public use, the owner is entitled to receive 
just compensation. Such compensation is generally measured by the 
market value of the property taken or damaged, plus compensation 
for severance damages to the property not taken. 111 The principle 
goal of compensation in eminent domain cases is to reimburse the 
owner for that which is taken,112 but not to compensate the owner 
for all incidental damages suffered as a result of the taking. 113 For 
example, where the government takes property particularly suited 
to the owner's business, and the owner is unable to relocate else-
where, the loss of the business is incidental to the taking, and 
therefore not compensable. 114 Loss of profits due to the condemnation 
109 [d. at 29-30, 10 So. at 269. 
110 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Gibbs, 183 Ark. 512, 36 S.W.2d 961 (1931) (holding 
that the septic tank at defendant's textile plant constituted a permanent nuisance); Southern 
Ice and Utilities Co. v. Bryan, 187 Ark. 186, 58 S. W.2d 920 (1933) (holding that the defendant's 
ice plant constituted a permanent nuisance); Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., Ltd., 
89 Wash. 320, 154 P. 450 (1916) (holding that the defendant's cement plant could be found to 
constitute a permanent nuisance). 
111 Orange County Flood Control District v. Sunny Crest Dairy, 77 Cal.App.3d 742, 763, 
143 Cal. Rptr. 803, 815 (1978). See generally 25A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 136 (1950). 
Severance dantages are awarded in cases where a portion of a single tract is taken. Such 
dantages include any element of value arising out of the relation of the part taken to the entire 
tract. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1942). 
112 U.S. v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961); Schniable v. City of 
Bismark, 275 N.W.2d 859, 865 (N.D. 1979). 
113 Orange County, 77 Cal.App.3d at 763, 143 Cal.Rptr. at 915; Brooks v. New Orleans Pub. 
Serv., Inc., 370 So.2d 686,690, writ denied 373 So.2d 512 (La.Ct.App. 1979). But see City of 
Yonkers v. State, 40 N.Y.2d 408, 386 N.Y.S.2d 865, 353 N.E.2d 829 (1976) (owner of land 
retained after appropriation entitled to compensation for all substantial elements of compens-
able dantage to his property, including, in appropriate cases, increased traffic noise). 
114 Mitchell v. U.S., 267 U.S. 341 (1924) (holding that destruction of plaintiff's corn growing 
business due to the condemnation of uniquely adapted property was incidental to the taking 
and not compensable). 
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of property has likewise been deemed incidental to the taking and 
not compensable. 116 Courts have viewed the incidental damages such 
as loss of business, loss of profits, discomfort, disturbance, incon-
venience, or loss of sentimental value in the property taken as the 
price one must pay for living in a civilized society. As noted by 
Justice Frankfurter in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 
In view, however, of the liability of all property to condemnation 
for the cornmon good, loss to the owner of nontransferable values 
deriving from his unique need for property or idiosyncratic at-
tachment to it, like loss due to an exercise of the police power, 
is properly treated as part of the burden of common citizen-
ship.u6 
A permanent nuisance, in contrast, is not an eminent domain 
taking when the defendant is a private citizen. It is rather a tortious 
invasion of private property rights. As such, the measure of damages 
should not be the same as in eminent domain cases. The principle 
goal of tort damages, as opposed to eminent domain compensation, 
is to compensate the plaintiff for all injuries proximately caused by 
the defendant's actions.ll7 In a permanent nuisance case, then, the 
plaintiff should be compensated for all injuries received rather than 
only for the property lost. This measure of damages would include 
compensation for the property lost and for incidental injuries which 
are not recognized in eminent domain actions. Damages for incidental 
injuries are not recoverable in eminent domain cases because, as 
Justice Frankfurter suggests, society as a whole is benefited if citi-
zens whose property is condemned are required to bear the loss of 
the incidental injuries that accompany the taking. When such injuries 
are suffered as a result of a tort committed by a private party, 
however, the benefit inures not to the "common good," but primarily 
to the tortfeasor. Society as a whole does not benefit from the loss 
of the property's incidental value to the owner. Therefore, the prin-
ciple justification present in condemnatioils for imposing these inci-
dental costs on the owner is not present in tort cases. 
116 u.s. In: rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1942) (denying 
recovery of lost profits where the federal government condemned land that the defendant was 
going to use in creating a large hydroelectric power project). 
118 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1948) (holding that, where the government condemned the defendant's 
laundry business for four years, the defendant should be allowed to recover for diminution in 
the valu~ of its laundry business due to destruction of trade routes on the grounds that the 
trade routes represent tangible and valuable business assets). 
117 Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 641 (10th Cir. 1963); Drayton v. Jaffe Chern. Corp., 395 
F.Supp. 1081, 1096 (N.D.Ohio 1975). 
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The plaintiff in a pennanent nuisance case suffers not only from a 
loss of an easement affecting the use and enjoyment of his property, 
but also from a loss of his dispositional rights in regard to that 
easement. 118 The diminution of market value compensates for the 
easement taken,119 but not for the loss of dispositional rights. In an 
eminent domain case, the diminution of market value would suffice 
as the sole measure of compensation for the property taken. The 
loss of the dispositional rights could be viewed as damages incidental 
to the taking, and hence not compensable. But in a pennanent nuis-
ance case, where the defendant is a private citizen, the plaintiff 
should be compensated for the loss of dispositional rights as well. In 
these instances, then, the diminution of market value is inadequate 
as the sole measure of damages, since it does not compensate for 
the loss of dispositional rights. 
The use of diminution of market value as the measure of damages 
might also be explained by the fact that the pennanent nuisance 
doctrine evolved in part from the pennanent injury doctrine. 12O If 
the plaintiff's property suffered pennanent physical injury, the mea-
sure of damages was the diminution of the property's market 
value. 121 In adopting the future damages concept, the courts couched 
early pennanent nuisance cases in tenns of pennanent injury. In 
Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. McCray,122 for example, the defendant, 
a resort hotel, discharged sewage into a stream, thus rendering it 
unfit for use by the downstream plaintiff. In detennining whether 
the plaintiff was required to recover all damages in one action or 
bring successive actions, the Virginia Supreme Court noted, "[t]he 
question presented by the rejected plea [of statute of limitations] is 
simply whether the injury is of a pennanent character, resulting 
from a pennanent structure .... "123 Strictly speaking, the injury 
itself was not pennanent. The plaintiff could have used the water 
again had the defendant stopped discharging sewage into the stream. 
The real issue, then, was the pennanence of the cause of the injury, 
rather than the pennanence of the injury even though the court 
spoke in tenns of the latter. While this framing of the issue allowed 
nineteenth century courts to grant a plaintiff relief that was previ-
118 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. 
119 Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 319,309 N.Y.S.2d at 228,257 N.E.2d at 875. 
120 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
122 106 Va. 461, 56 S.E. 216 (1907). 
123 [d. at 471, 56 S.E. at 220. 
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ously denied,124 it also resulted in application of the "permanent 
injUry" measure of damages to "permanent cause" cases. 
A temporary, recurring injury to the plaintiff's property, however, 
is distinguishable from a single invasion of the property that results 
in a permanent physical injury. In a permanent nuisance case, the 
plaintiff suffers injuries that are not suffered in the case of a per-
manent injury case, and for which the diminution of market value 
does not compensate. Application of the permanent nuisance doctrine 
affects not only the plaintiff's undiminished use and enjoyment of 
his land, but also his right to control the disposition of his property. 125 
These dispositional rights are an inherent and important aspect of 
private property ownership. A court that permits one private citizen 
to force a private property owner to sell him the owner's property 
at a set price violates our society's concept of property ownership. 126 
Accordingly, the derogation of the plaintiff's dispositional rights, 
which results from the inevitable forced-sale aspect of the permanent 
nuisance doctrine, is a concrete injury to the plaintiff just as is the 
diminution in use and enjoyment of the property. 
In the case of a permanent injury resulting from a single invasion 
of the plaintiff's property, the plaintiff does not suffer this loss of 
dispositional rights. The basic principle of nuisance law is that a 
property owner has the right to be free of unreasonable interference 
with the use and enjoyment of his property.127 A necessary corollary 
of this principle is that the right to affect the use and enjoyment of 
property is vested solely in the owner. In a permanent injury case, 
the defendant's actions result in a single disturbance of the plaintiff's 
right to exclusive control over the use and enjoyment of the prop-
erty. The result of that single disturbance - the injury to the 
property and the consequent diminution in the use and enjoyment 
- is ongoing, but the plaintiff's loss of exclusive control over his 
property is not. The plaintiff regains exclusive control once the 
defendant ceases his tortious activity. On the other hand, in the case 
of a permanent nuisance, the plaintiff not only loses a certain 
"amount" of use and enjoyment, but also the right of exclusive 
control over the use and enjoyment of the property. This loss is 
permanent, and is what distinguishes the permanent nuisance case 
124 See supra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
126 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
126 McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser, Co., 76 Cal.App.2d 247,251-52, 172 P.2d 758,761 (1946). 
127 Morgan v. High Penn Oil, Co., 238 N.C. 185, 193,77 S.E.2d 682,689 (1953). See generally 
Prosser, The Law of Torts § 86. 
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from the permanent injury case. Since the permanent injury case 
does not involve a forced sale of this right to exclusive control, it 
therefore involves no corresponding loss of dispositional rights. In 
both cases, the diminution of market value compensates for the loss 
of an "amount" of use and enjoyment, but not for the loss of the 
plaintiff's dispositional rights in permanent nuisance cases. 
While potentially failing to compense the plaintiff adequately, the 
court's use of diminution of market value as the sole measure of 
damages may also be economically inefficient. l28 The economic anal-
ysis is based on the assumption that there is some price for which 
the plaintiff would voluntarily sell to the defendant the right to 
continue the nuisance. 129 This price represents the subjective worth 
to the plaintiff of the marginal diminution in the use and enjoyment 
of his property that results from the nuisance. 130 The diminution of 
the property's market value represents the community consensus of 
the value of the marginal diminution in use and enjoyment. 131 The 
difference between the market price and the plaintiff's subjective 
price is the consumer surplus; it represents the special, personal 
value that the plaintiff attaches to the marginal use and enjoyment 
that is over and above the value attached to it by the community. 132 
For example, a long-time owner of a family residence is likely to 
value the home more than the community at large as a result of the 
sentimental attachment or idiosyncratic attachment to certain indi-
vidual characteristics of the home. For optimum economic efficiency, 
this consumer surplus should be taken into account. 
Assume, for example, a cement factory is built on a lot adjacent 
to the homeowner. Assume also that the homeowner's use and en-
joyment is affected in proportion to the output of the factory: the 
greater the output, the greater the diminution of the homeowner's 
use and enjoyment. The economically desirable output level is the 
level at which the marginal profit of the factory equals the marginal 
damages to the homeowner.l33 The imposition of nuisance liability 
128 For arguments concerning the role of economic efficiency in the law generally, see 
Calabresi and Melamed, Property Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1976); Epstein, 
Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49 (1979). 
129 Ellickson, supra note 86, at 735. 
lao See id. at 736. 
131Id. 
132 I d. at 735-'J6. 
133 See Polinsky, supra note 102, at 1082. The marginal profit is the extra profit resulting 
from the production of the last unit of goods at a given level of output. Id. Similarly, the 
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on the cement company will force it to internalize the cost to the 
homeowner, which is represented by the homeowner's damages. As 
a result, the company will choose to produce at the economically 
desirable level. 134 If the company is required to pay only the dimin-
ution of market value, however, it will not produce at the most 
efficient level. The owner's consumer surplus is not taken into ac-
count, so the total cost of producing the cement will not be inter-
nalized. 135 The resulting overall marginal cost to society of the pro-
duction level chosen will thus exceed the marginal benefit for that 
level. The use of diminution of market value as the sole measure of 
damages is therefore likely to be economically inefficient. 136 
Permanent nuisance cases not involving a public entity, then, are 
fundamentally different than either eminent domain cases or cases 
involving a permanent injury to the plaintiff's property. As such, 
the measure of damages used in the latter types of cases - the 
diminution of market value - should not be the sole measure of 
damages in private permanent nuisance cases. The plaintiff should 
be allowed to recover for the loss of dispositional rights resulting 
from the forced sale of an easement to another private entity. 
A major problem with allowing the plaintiff to recover damages 
for the loss of dispositional rights is the difficulty of determining 
with certainty the extent of damage. Even though the plaintiff has 
sustained a legal injury - the loss of dispositional rights resulting 
from the involuntary sale of an easement - the plaintiff, in order 
to recover more than nominal damages, must show with reasonable 
probability that damage was suffered as a result of the legal injury. 137 
Where the existence of damage is established, however, difficulty in 
determining the extent of the damage will not bar recovery so long 
as the evidence is sufficient to provide a basis for a reasonable 
inference as to the extent of damage. 138 
marginal damage to the homeowner is the extra damage resulting from the production of the 
last unit of goods. [d. 
184 See id. at 1090. Theoretically, the same result would be reached if the company was not 
held liable for any of the damage caused by the cement production since the homeowner would 
then offer to pay the company not to produce the economically ineffecient marginal unit. [d. 
135 Ellickson, supra note 86, at 736. 
136 A more complex analysis,though, reveals several possible flaws in this statement. A 
principle counterargument is that miscalculation of the true cost of production is preferable 
to the possibly high administrative cost of calculating the homeowner's consumer surplus. [d. 
137 Apperson v. Security State Bank, 215 Kan. 724, 735-36, 528 P.2d 1211, 1220 (1974). See 
generally 25 C.J.S. Darrw.ges § 27 (1950). 
136 Michaud v. Vahlsing, Inc., 264 A.2d 539, 545 (1970); Matthews v. Lineberry, 241 S.E.2d 
735,737, writ den. 244 S.E.2d 259 (N.C.Ct.App. 1978). See generally McCormick, supra note 
18, § 27, 102; Annotation, Distinction Between Uncertainty as to Whether Substantial Dam-
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In Michaud v. Vahlsing, Inc.,139 for instance, the defendant, a 
potato processor, was held liable to the potato farmer for allowing 
the farmer's potatoes to spoil. The exact amount of potatoes that 
spoiled, however, was not determined. On appeal, the defendant 
argued that the verdict for the plaintiff could not stand because the 
plaintiff did not prove the extent of his damages with reasonable 
certainty.140 The Maine Supreme Court upheld the award by distin-
guishing between uncertainty as to the existence of damage and 
uncertainty as to the amount of damage. 141 The court noted that, 
where substantial damages are established, a plaintiff is not denied 
recovery even though the monetary value of the damages is "either 
entirely uncertain or extremely difficult of ascertainment."142 In such 
cases, the amount is fixed by the court or by the jury in the exercise 
of sound discretion. 143 In essence, this view imposes on the plaintiff 
a very light burden of proof on the issue of the amount of damages 
once a legal injury has been established. 
In a permanent nuisance case, the existence of a legal injury is 
relatively certain. The plaintiff in a permanent nuisance case loses 
the right to determine whether and for how much to sell the defen-
dant an easement. 144 The damage resulting from this involuntary 
sale is essentially the difference between the price that the plaintiff 
would have voluntarily sold the easement for and the price which 
the plaintiff was forced to accept, that is, the fair market value of 
the easement as measured by the diminution of the property's mar-
ket value. 146 If there were no difference between these two amounts, 
then there would be no damage resulting from the involuntary sale. 
As noted by the court in Boomer, though, ''it would be unrealistic 
to assume that the defendant could acquire a servitude. . . by simply 
paying the price which a willing seller would accept. "146 The plaintiff 
is simply not a willing seller. If he were, it is reasonable to assume 
that the plaintiff would have settled out of court for the market 
value. It is safe to assume that the plaintiff's voluntary sale price is 
greater than the fair market value, thus establishing the existence 
~es Resulted and Uncertainties as to Amount, 78 A.L.R. 858 (1932); 25 C.J.S. Damages 
§ 28 (1950). 
139 264 A.2d 539 (Me. 1970). 
140 [d. at 544. 
141 [d. at 544-45. 
142 [d. at 545. 
143 [d. 
144 See supra text and notes accompanying notes 82-94. 
146 See supra text and note accompanying note 103. 
146 Kinley, 42 A.D.2d at 499,349 N.Y.S.2d at 202 (Herlihy, P.J., concurring). 
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of damage. Accordingly, the plaintiff should be allowed to recover 
damages for loss of dispositional rights if sufficient evidence is pre-
sented to allow the fact finder to approximate the extent of the 
damage. The problem of determining the extent of the damages is 
considered below. 147 
Apart from failure to compensate for loss of dispositional rights, 
the use of diminution of market value as the sole measure of future 
damages is inconsistent with the measure of damages for traditional 
trespass and nuisance cases. In cases of past trespass or nuisance, 
the plaintiff is entitled to recover for past annoyance and discomfort 
in addition to any diminution of rental value resulting from the 
defendant's actions. In French v. Ralph E. Moore, Inc.,148 for ex-
ample, the plaintiff's home and restaurant were filled with gasoline 
vapor as a result of a leak in the defendant's underground gasoline 
storage tank. The plaintiff and his family were forced to close the 
restaurant, and were prohibited from using the lower floor of their 
house. 149 In addition, the plaintiff's family suffered health effects, 
such as dizziness, headaches, nausea, and ulcers. 150 The trial court 
awarded the plaintiff $58,500 for diminution of their property's mar-
ket value, plus $190,000 for "pain, discomfort, fear, anxiety, annoy-
ance, and inconvenience, and other mental, physical and emotional 
distress. "151 On appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiff could 
not recover the latter element of damages in a nuisance action. 152 
The Montana Supreme Court upheld the lower court, noting that, 
in nuisance actions, the plaintiff may recover damages for discomfort 
and annoyance in addition to damages for injury to the land. 153 
Discomfort and annoyance are distinct grounds of compensation that 
may be recovered in addition to diminution of market value due to 
the nuisance. 1M 
Recognition of discomfort and annoyance as distinct grounds for 
recovery should not be limited to determination of past damages, 
but should be extended to deter.mination of future damages in per-
manent nuisance cases. Where the effect of the defendant's nuisance 
is temporary, but recurring, the discomfort and annoyance suffered 
147 See infra text and notes accompanying notes 164-184. 
148 661 P.2d 844 (Mont. 1983). 
148 I d. at 845. 
160 Id. 
151Id. 
162 Id. at 847. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920. 
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by the plaintiff will also continue. Since the diminution of market 
value compensates only for injury to the proprietary interests,l55 the 
plaintiff will not be compensated for future annoyance and discomfort 
if the permanent damages are limited to diminution of market value. 
This view seems to have been impliedly adopted by the California 
Supreme Court in Komoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil CO.I56 In that 
case, the plaintiff's house and shop were inundated with fumes, dust, 
dirt, lint, sediment and waste material emitted from the defendant's 
cotton gin. The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was 
entitled to recover for diminution of market value and for discomfort 
and annoyance as a result of the ginning. 157 On appeal, the California 
Supreme Court held that the defendant's gin constituted a perma-
nent nuisance for which all damages, past, present and future were 
recoverable. l58 In upholding the trial court's jury instructions re-
garding recovery for discomfort and annoyance in addition to dimin-
ution of market value, the court did not distinguish between past 
discomfort and future discomfort. Instead, the court allowed recov-
ery for discomfort and annoyance that was a "natural consequence" 
of the injury to the real property.159 Future discomfort and annoy-
ance are natural consequences of future dust deposition just as past 
discomfort and annoyance are natural consequences of past dust 
deposition. Measuring permanent damages solely by diminution of 
market value, therefore, is inconsistent with the measure of past 
damages. 
However the additional damages are characterized, any recogni-
tion of additional damages mitigates a number of shortcomings of 
the permanent nuisance doctrine. While the plaintiff is still forced 
to give the defendant an easement to continue the nuisance, the 
recognition of the additional damage elements for the involuntary 
sale compensates for infringement of the plaintiff's dispositional 
rights. Where the plaintiff is permitted to recover more than the 
market value of the easement, the forced sale becomes less invol-
untary. Since the plaintiff receives a higher price for the easement, 
the sale itself is more palatable to the plaintiff. In this way, the 
award of additional damages mitigates to a certain extent the de-
rogation of the plaintiff's dispositional rights. The court's award of 
155 Kornoff v. Kingsbury Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal.2d 265, 273, 288 P.2d 507, 512 (1955). 
166 45 Cal.2d 265, 288 P.2d 507 (1955). 
167Id. at 267-68, 288 P.2d at 508-09. 
158 Id. at 271, 288 P.2d at 511. 
169Id. at 273, 288 P.2d at 512. 
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additional damages also distinguishes between eminent domain and 
permanent nuisance cases. Such damages would demonstrate that 
the incidental injuries resulting from the acquisition by the defendant 
of an easement are not burdens of citizenship to be born by the 
plaintiff. Rather, they are injuries resulting from a tortious invasion 
of the plaintiff's property rights, the cost of which, according to 
traditional tort principles and economic policy, should be born by the 
wrongdoer rather than the injured party. 160 
These additional damages also lessen the force of economic criti-
cisms of the permanent nuisance doctrine. When the incidental in-
juries are compensated by damages in addition to the diminution of 
market value, the defendant is forced to bear the full cost to society 
of his activity. As a result, the defendant will adjust the level of his 
activity to the optimal point at which the marginal benefit to society, 
as represented by his profit, will equal the true marginal cost to 
society of production at that level. Finally, an award of damages in 
addition to diminution of market value makes future nuisance dam-
ages consistent with past trespass and nuisance damages. In both 
types of damages, the plaintiff should be allowed to recover for injury 
to the property - diminution of market value - and for injury to 
the occupant - the additional damages for the loss of dispositional 
rights or future discomfort and annoyance. Judicial recognition of 
these additional damages in private permanent nuisance cases, then, 
would rectify a number of flaws in the permanent nuisance doctrine, 
and would improve a widely applied and useful remedy. 
B. Valuation of Involuntary Sale Damages 
While the additional damages for the judicially forced sale should 
be recoverable in permanent nuisance cases, valuation of those dam-
ages is somewhat problematic. One solution to this valuation problem 
was fashioned by the N ew York Supreme Court in Boomer v. At-
lantic Cement CO.161 The court considered the plaintiff's estimate of 
what he would be willing to accept for an easement to interfere with 
the use and enjoyment of his property, but used the diminution of 
market value to check the inherent subjectivity of the plaintiff's 
160 See supra text and note accompanying note 117. 
161 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 72 Misc.2d 834,340 N.Y.S.2d 97, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), 
enforcing 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970), rev'g 30 
A.D.2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968), aff'g 55 Misc.2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.2d 
112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd sub nom Kinley v. Atlantic Cement Co., 42 A.D.2d 496,349 
N.Y.S.2d 199 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). 
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estimate. In this way, the court was able to compensate the plaintiff 
fully for his losses, and, at the same time, to mitigate the inflated 
and subjective nature of the damages. 
The major drawback of an award of damages for the involuntary 
sale is the subjectiveness of the plaintiff's injury, and the resulting 
difficulty in determining the appropriate amount. The injury that 
results from the trespassory invasion of dispositional rights is the 
difference between the price at which plaintiff would have voluntar-
ily sold the easement, and the price at which the plaintiff was forced 
to sell the easement, that is, the market value. l62 For the plaintiff 
to receive more than nominal damages for his injury, he would have 
to provide evidence regarding this price difference. The problem 
here is that the voluntary price is inherently subjective since it is 
based in part on the subjective value that the plaintiff attaches to 
the property. The court cannot rely solely on the plaintiff's estima-
tion of his own voluntary price, since the temptation would be great 
to overstate the price he would accept for the easement. l63 The 
difficulty of determining the exact damages done by a wrongdoer, 
or of creating a precise formula for computing damages is not, how-
ever, cause for denying redress. l64 Accordingly, the courts should 
allow the plaintiff to recover more than nominal damages if he can 
provide sufficient evidence to allow the fact finder to infer a volun-
tary price in excess of the market value of the easement. 
One commentator, Ellickson, suggests that, in nuisance cases, the 
property owner be awarded an amount based on the subjective value 
of the property when damages are awarded in lieu of an injunction. 165 
He argues that one way to accomplish this would be for the legis-
lature to enact a statutory compensation schedule that considers 
commonly held valuation factors , 166 such as longevity of occupation 
or convenience to the workplace. Such objective factors could also 
be used by the courts as a basis for determining the plaintiff's 
voluntary price in permanent nuisance cases. While no mathematical 
formula could be devised using these factors, they would provide an 
objective touchstone for the fact-finder's use when determining dam-
ages. If such factors were used, the determination of compensation 
in permanent nuisance cases would then be similar to the determi-
162 This difference is the consumer surplus discussed earlier. See supra text accompanying 
notes 130-133. 
163 See Boomer, 72 Misc.2d at 843,340 N.Y.S.2d at 107. 
164 [d. at 838,340 N.Y.S.2d at 101; Baker v. Akron, 145 Iowa 485,490 (1910). 
165 Ellickson, supra note 86, at 736. 
166 [d. 
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nation of pain and suffering damages in personal injury cases. 167 
Thus, a rough estimate of the plaintiff's voluntary sale price is 
calculable. From this, the court could determine an estimate of the 
injury suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the involuntary sale. 
Since this injury is subject to determination, the trespass damages 
for the infringement on the plaintiff's dispositional rights should not 
be limited to a nominal amount. In sum, the sUbjectiveness of the 
injury in a permanent nuisance case should not bar the recovery of 
damages for loss of dispositional rights. 
C. The Boomer Court's Solution 
Another possible solution to the problem of determining the 
amount of damages for the involuntary sale is to balance the contract 
price, the special market price, and the diminution of market value, 
as done by the court in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 168 In Boomer, 
a dairy farmer and other property owners sued a neighboring cement 
manufacturing company for creating a nuisance as a result of its 
emission of large quantities of dust, smoke, and excessive noise. The 
plaintiffs sought an injunction plus damages for past injuries. When 
faced with the prospect of closing down a $45 million plant that 
employed over 300 people, however, the Appellate Division instead 
declared the plant to be a permanent nuisance, and allowed the 
plaintiffs to recover future damages. 169 
On remand, the Supreme Court considered the issue of damages. 
The plaintiff urged that the proper measure of damages should be 
the contract price or, alternatively, the special market value of the 
property. The contract price is the price at which the plaintiff would 
have been willing to sell to the defendant the right to continue the 
nuisance. 17o The special market price, on the other hand, is the price 
of the plaintiff's property based on the special market created in the 
area by the defendant's prior land purchases. l7l The plaintiffs' ex-
perts testified that the contract price of the plaintiffs' property was 
$918,000, while the special market value was $840,000. 172 There is 
no indication, however, as to how these figures were determined. 
167 "[A]s to pain and suffering the law declares that there is no standard by which to measure 
it except the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors .... " Toll v. Waters, 138 Fla. 349, 353, 
183 So. 393, 395 (1939). 
168 Boomer, 72 Misc.2d 834,340 N.Y.S.2d 97. 
169 Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d 219,309 N.Y.S.2d 312,257 N.E.2d 870 (1972). 
170 Boomer, 72 Misc.2d at 837, 340 N. Y.S.2d at 100. 
171 [d. 
172 [d. at 840-41, 340 N. Y.S.2d at 104. 
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The defendant, on the other hand, insisted that the court should 
strictly apply the market value rule. "Any other considerations," the 
defendant argued, "would be speculative and uncertain."173 Even the 
market value estimates, however, varied widely. The plaintiffs' ex-
pert came up with diminutions of market value of approximately 
$400,000,174 while the estimates of the defendant's experts were 
$35,000 and $25,000. 175 
Rather than accept either argument, the court took a middle 
ground. The court noted that this was not an eminent domain case, 
but rather a case involving two private parties. The diminution of 
market value should not be the sole measure of damages, then, or 
the case would result in a private taking. 176 On the other hand, the 
court noted that the plaintiffs' measures of damages were likely to 
be excessive and overly speculative.177 To counter this effect, the 
court used the diminution of market value as an objective check on 
the overly subjective contract price and special market price. 178 After 
reviewing the testimony regarding the various values, the court 
noted, 
If analogy is found in Newton's experiment with prisms showing 
that white light is composed of all the colors of the spectrum, 
each lending its own characteristics to a degree when passed 
through a prism, all the approaches to valuation entering into 
the informed mind and sensitive conscience of the court lend to 
an appropriate degree in the resulting decision. In determining 
permanent damages we have noted: (1) The temporary damages 
already found insofar as they assist us. (2) The damage from 
[when the nuisance began] to date. (3) The fair market value 
with and without the nuisance. (4) The consideration of [the 
contract price and the special market value]. (5) The future 
damages. In applying the statement above . . . we find the per-
manent damage to the plaintiffs to be: $175,000. We find the 
[diminution of the fair market value] to be: [$140,000].179 
Implicit in this balancing test is the court's attempt to compensate 
the plaintiff for all injuries suffered by awarding the voluntary price 
of the easement. The ideal situation would have been for the defen-
dant to bargain with the plaintiff to buy the easement before the 
178Id. at 837,340 N.Y.S.2d at 10l. 
174Id. at 840,340 N.Y.S.2d at 104. 
176Id. at 841,340 N.Y.S.2d at 105. 
176 See id. at 83Eh37, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 100. 
177 Id. at 843,340 N.Y.S.2d at 107. 
178Id. 
179Id. at 844,340 N.Y.S.2d at 108. 
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nuisance began. In that situation, there would be neither an invol-
untary sale nor a tortious invasion of the plaintiff's rights, since the 
plaintiff's duly acquired consent would render the defendant's ac-
tions lawful. If the court could determine this ideal, bargained-for 
price, then the plaintiff would essentially be put in the same position 
he would have been in had this prior bargaining taken place. In 
terms of the specific injuries discussed earlier,l80 the award of the 
voluntary price would compensate the plaintiff for all losses suffered. 
The diminution of market value compensates for the easement ac-
quired by the defendant which gives him the right to affect the use 
and enjoyment o( the plaintiff's property in the future. lSI The dif-
ference between this market value and the voluntary price repre-
sents the pecuniary loss due to the infringement of the plaintiff's 
dispositional rights. l82 Therefore, the award of the voluntary sale 
price would compensate the plaintiff for both the loss of the easement 
and the loss of the dispositional rights. By taking the plaintiff's 
theories into account, the court impliedly adopted the voluntary sale 
price as its ideal goal in setting damages. 
By considering both plaintiff's own measures of his damages and 
the diminution of market value, the court in Boomer found a good 
way to determine the voluntary price of the easement. The amount 
that the plaintiff claims he would have taken for the property is 
likely an inflated value. More likely, the plaintiff's stated contract 
price is the amount that the plaintiff would have liked to have 
received for the easement. The court could not, however, let the 
plaintiff set his own damages, since the plaintiff is entitled to com-
pensation for his losses and no more. l83 Due to the give and take 
nature of contract negotiations, the plaintiff probably could not have 
received the wished-for amount even in before-the-fact bargaining. 
The court's consideration of the plaintiff's requested damages, 
though, reflects the importance of the voluntary price of the ease-
ment. By tempering the plaintiff's wished-for amount with the more 
concrete diminution of market value, the court substantially reduced 
the risk of over-compensation, and brought the damages closer to 
the probable negotiation price. In this way, the court more fully 
compensated the plaintiff for all of his losses while mitigating the 
180 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
188 E.g., Worldwide Carriers v. Aria Steamship Co., 301 F.Supp. 70, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); 
see also Harrington v. Texaco, 339 F.2d 814, 820 (5th Cir.), em. denied 381 U.S. 915 (1965). 
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danger of overcompensation due to the subjective nature of the 
plaintiff's theories. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As shown by the court's Solomonic decision in the Boomer case, 
application of the permanent nuisance doctrine to cases in which the 
defendant is a private citizen is often necessary to achieve an equi-
table resolution of conflicts arising from mutually antagonistic uses 
of property. In such cases, though, the use of the diminution of 
market value as the sole measure of damages is unfair to the plaintiff. 
In determining damages, the courts should bear in mind that the 
defendant is a tortfeasor. As such, the emphasis of the courts should 
be on full compensation for the plaintiff's injuries rather than on 
determining the market price of the easement taken. The courts 
should allow recovery of the involuntary sale damages in addition to 
recovery of diminution of market value. Such damages would com-
pensate the plaintiff for his loss of dispositional rights. In this way, 
the courts would achieve a truly equitable solution: the harsh solution 
of enjoining the defendant would be avoided, and the plaintiff would 
be afforded full compensation for the tortious invasion of his property 
rights. 
